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This thesis has two chapters. The common objective across both chapters is the 
optimization of marketing mix variables. In the first chapter, I will be exploring the joint 
optimal pricing and advertising policy for the diffusion of new products. Previous researchers 
have attempted this problem but their choice of diffusion models and derived solutions suffer 
from major short comings. This research is the first to use an empirically validated diffusion 
model and to yield explicit solutions for the joint optimal pricing and advertising policies in 
terms of model variables without having to assume a zero discount rate. As such, they are 
much more helpful to the marketing managers that need to make pricing and advertising 
decisions. The solutions suggest that the optimal price trajectory can be characterized by a 
decreasing function or an increase-decrease function. The solutions also suggest that the 
optimal advertising expenditure trajectory can be characterized by an increasing function or a 
decrease-increase function. In general, the sequence for time of peak price and trough 
advertising is determined by the ratio of demand sensitivity to changes in price over changes 
in advertising.    
In the second chapter, I will be exploring the effects of organic online search results 
on the optimal bidding strategies for online sponsored ads using a game-theoretic framework. 
In the game setting, we have a vertically differentiated market with consumers that are 
heterogeneous in product knowledge and preference for different types of online search 
results. Previous research suggests that “a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm 
and obtain a position below it, yet it still obtains more clicks than the inferior firm (Position 
Paradox)” (Jerath et al. 2011). Although my model is similar to theirs, it has the added 
consideration of organic search results. My results suggest that the position paradox 
phenomenon cannot occur when the superior firm has an accessible organic link. In this 
model, “Position Paradox” is replaced by “Organic Advantage”. A firm enjoys organic 
advantage when it has a better ranked organic link and no incentive to bid for online 
sponsored ad space. This applies to both the superior and inferior firm. Having a better ranked 
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organic link can protect a firm from aggressive bidders that have superior profit margins. 
From this research, marketing managers can better understand (1) the nature of “position 
paradox” and “organic advantage”; (2) the competitive advantages of have a better ranked 
organic link; (3) and the advantages of having an accessible organic link. This better 
understanding can aid in the allocation of resources between Search Engine Optimization 
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From the perspective of new product diffusion theory, the market is made up 
of two categories of consumers. In the first category, we have the consumers that 
have already bought (adopters) the product. In the second category, we have the 
potential consumers. These potential consumers are likely to purchase the product 
sometime in the future. The rate of conversion from potential consumers to adopters 
can depend on many factors. Some of the more important factors are word-of-mouth 
(from adopters), pricing and advertising.  
From the three figures (figures 1 to 3) below, we can see that the sales, price 
and advertising expenditure for Apple's iPad are changing in a systematic manner.  
This suggests that marketing managers could be concerned about both the immediate 
and long-term impact of changing prices and advertising expenditure on product sales.  
















Figure 2: iPad 2 Average Selling Price (Q1 2011 – Q1 2012) 
http://mattrichman.net/post/21734931422/iphone-and-ipad-asp-both-down 
 
Figure 3: iPad Advertising Expenditure (FY2010 - FY2011) 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/3/3218846/schiller-forstall-fight-club-day-three-apple-samsung-trial 
 
Most companies have to determine jointly the pricing and advertising 
























to determine jointly because they are to a significant extent "substitute strategies". If a 
marketing manager wants to increase the number of units sold, he can choose to either 
lower price or increase advertising expenditure. The number of units sold can still be 
increased if the impact on demand of an increase in price is more than offset by the 
impact on demand of an increase in advertising expenditure. Such a strategy could be 
optimal if consumers are more sensitive to changes in advertising expenditure than 
changes in price. This is only one example of what the optimal pricing and 
advertising strategy could be. A more complete and systematic analysis of the 
dynamic impact on sales of various pricing and advertising strategies could produce 
an array of interesting results. The main objective of this research is to derive 
conditions under which the optimal pricing and advertising trajectories can be jointly 
determined. 
Literature Review: 
There has been a lot of research done in the area of optimal pricing, optimal 
advertising and capacity planning both separately and jointly. Three recent papers, Ho 
et al. (2002), Kumar and Swaminathan (2003) and Shen et al. (2011) considered the 
problem of jointly managing production decisions and new product sales when 
capacity is constrained. In these 3 papers, the prices are exogenously given and the 
objective is to decide on production rate, capacity and sales. Krishnan and Jain (2006) 
considered the problem of optimal advertising when prices are exogenously given. 
Their results suggest that "optimal advertising is determined by the advertising 
effectiveness, discount rate, and the ratio of advertisement to profits. Depending upon 
the interplay among these factors, the optimal advertising takes decrease-increase, 
increase-decrease, monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing shape." 
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Krishnan et al. (1999) considered the problem of optimal pricing. Their results 
suggest that the optimal price trajectory is either "declining or has an increase-
decrease pricing pattern that does not seem close to the sales path". As mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, the optimal pricing and advertising strategy can be difficult to 
determine jointly because they are to a significant extent "substitute strategies". As 
such, it is unclear whether the joint optimal pricing and advertising strategies will still 
remain the same as those recommended in Krishnan and Jain (2006) and Krishnan et 
al. (1999).  
For the remaining portion of this section, I will provide a more detailed 
review of 6 papers that had considered both advertising and pricing in the new 
product diffusion context. The authors and models are detailed in table 1. In general, 
there are 3 major issues with these 6 papers. The first issue concerns explicit solutions. 
In many instances, the optimal price (or advertising) is given as a function of optimal 
cumulative sales which is itself a function of optimal advertising. The reason for 
keeping the solution in this form is because there is no closed-form solution for 
cumulative sales. Such characterization of optimal policies is of limited use to 
marketing managers. The second issue is a lack of a discounting term. The 
significance of dynamic optimization is greatly reduced if one has no preference for 
earning the revenue today or tomorrow. The third issue is empirical support. The 
models used in these 6 papers have limited empirical support. In this paper, we 





Table 1: Literature Review 
Author Reference Model Proposed 
Thompson and 
Teng (1983) 
 ̇( ) =    ( ),  ( ),  ( ) , where  ( ) is cumulative sales, 
 ( ) is advertising effort and  ( ) is price. 
Teng and 
Thompson (1984) 
 ̇( ) = {[   +    ( )][1 −  ( )]+ [   +    ( )][1 −
 ( )] ( )}    ( ), where  ( ) is the market share,  ( ) is 





   ( ) −  ( )   
 




where   is a function for risk adjusted market potential at 
price p,   is a function of penetration,  ( ) is fraction of 
market that is aware of product,  ( ) is cumulative sales,  ( ) 
is advertising effort and    is total market size.  
Mesak  (1998) 
 
 ̇( ) =    ( ),  ( ),  ( ) , where  ( ) is cumulative sales, 
 ( ) is advertising effort and  ( ). 
Mesak and Clark 
(1996) 
 ̇( ) =  ( ( ),  ( ),  ( ),  ( ),  ), where  ( ) is cumulative 
sales,  ( ) is advertising effort,  ( ) is price and  ( ) is the 
number of similar outlets. 
Sethi et al. (2008)  ̇( ) =   ( )   ( )  1 −  ( ) −   ( ), where  ( ) is the 
market share,  ( ) is advertising effort and  ( ) is price. 
 
In Teng and Thompson (1983), several models were studied. However, only 
one allowed price, advertising and cumulative sales to simultaneously affect 
instantaneous sales. Furthermore, the analysis is done mostly while assuming 
discount rate is zero. As such, the results may not be applicable for durable goods. 
The main result of this model is that the marginal revenue product of advertising over 
the marginal advertising cost is always equal to the price elasticity.  
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In Thompson and Teng (1984), there is a section on optimal advertising and 
pricing policy for new products under a monopoly market structure. The optimal 
advertising policies are derived by pre-setting the rule for optimal pricing policy as 
either (1) variable pricing, (2) marginal pricing or (3) constant pricing. This approach 
is different from the one I adopted. Instead of pre-setting the rule for pricing prior to 
optimization, our derived optimal pricing policy is dependent on the model variables. 
Furthermore, the optimal advertising policy under the different rules is a function of 
the optimal cumulative demand, which itself is a function of optimal advertising. 
Although this does not affect the characterization of the optimal advertising policy, an 
explicit solution of the optimal advertising policy in terms of model parameters is 
impossible. This short-coming is due to the inability to derive the closed-form 
solution for cumulative sales. In my model, which makes use of the Generalised Bass 
Model (GBM), this short-coming is not present. For ease of reference, I will term this 
as the GBM advantage. In terms of results, Thompson and Teng (1984) suggest that 
there are only three possible different kinds of optimal advertising policies as follows: 
(1) No advertising at all over the whole time horizon; (2) Advertising during an initial 
time, then no advertising when the market becomes saturated; and (3) No advertising, 
then advertising finally no advertising again. “Although the recommended policy is a 
reasonable one, this is a phenomenon that we do not observe very often in the real 
world because many new products are introduced with high initial advertisement 
expenditure (Krishnan and Jain 2006)”. 
In Kalish (1985), sales of product are affected by level of awareness for the 
product, cumulative sales and price. Advertising is modelled to affect sales indirectly 
through awareness. The optimal advertising policy was derived while assuming 
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discount rate is zero. As such, the results may not be applicable for durable goods. 
The main result for optimal pricing policy suggests that the optimal pricing policy 
should be monotonically decreasing unless early adopters are significant in reducing 
uncertainty or in generating awareness. Note that these results, similar to those 
mentioned in Thompson and Teng (1984), suffer from not having the GBM advantage.  
In Mesak (1998), there is a general model (ref. table 1) and 10 specified 
models on new product diffusion. With the general model, Mesak (1998) showed that 
the ratio of advertising elasticity of demand to the price elasticity of demand is equal 
to the ratio of advertising to sales revenue multiplied by the marginal cost of 
advertising. There are no analytical results for optimal pricing and advertising policy 
for the general model. 7 out of 10 of the specified models yield analytical results by 
assuming discount rate is zero. Out of the 3 remaining specified models, 2 of them 
cannot be considered strictly as dynamic diffusion models. The remaining specified 
model suffers from not having the GBM advantage. In Mesak and Clark (1996), they 
have the added consideration of distribution in their model. Although Mesak and 
Clark (1996) is similar to Mesak (1998) in terms of solution technique, it derived the 
additional insight that the ratio of distribution elasticity of demand to the price 
elasticity of demand is equal to the ratio of direct distribution expenditure to sales 
revenue, multiplied by the marginal cost of distribution, divided by the operating 
expenses rate per unit retail outlet. However, due to the similarity in technique and 
model, their derived optimal pricing and advertising policies suffers from the same 
short-coming as those suggested in Mesak (1998).   
In Sethi et al. (2008), they proposed a new product diffusion model which is 
not reducible to the Bass model (1969). The derived optimal pricing policy is a 
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constant pricing policy. They also suggest that optimal advertising expenditure should 
be proportional to the remaining market size. This implies a monotonically decreasing 
advertising expenditure trajectory. Both the optimal pricing and advertising policies 
are over simplistic and not readily justified by market data. Furthermore, the optimal 
advertising policy suffers from not having the GBM advantage. 
To derive an optimal pricing and advertising policy, we plan to utilize the 
Generalized Bass Model by Bass et al, (1994). This model was explicitly designed to 
incorporate the effects of marketing mix variables on new product diffusion. 
Furthermore, the Generalized Bass Model has received substantial empirical support 
and could be solved to represent sales as an explicit function of time, price and 
advertising.  
Generalized Bass Model: 






 ( )  ( )                                                     (1.1) 
where  ̇( ) is the instantaneous sales at time t.  ( ) is the cumulative sales up to time 
t.   is the market size.   and   are diffusion parameters.  ( ) is a function for 
marketing effort that maps marketing decision variables to the impact on likelihood of 










                                         (1.2) 
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                                              (1.3) 
where  ( ) is the cumulating marketing effort up to time t. The GBM defines the 
marketing effort at time t and the cumulating marketing effort up to time t as   






                                                              (1.4) 
 ( ) =    ( )
 
 






                     (1.5) 
where  ( ) is the price of product at time t and  ( ) is the advertising expenditure at 
time t;  ′( ) and  ′( ) are the instantaneous change in price and advertising 







 denote the rate of change in price and advertising at time t 
respectively.  
Optimization: 
The objective function that needs to be optimized is the total discounted 
profits from time 0 to time T. It can be written as follows: 




where r is the discount rate,  ( ) is the marginal cost of production and T is length of 
the planning horizon. By substituting equation (1.2) into the above objective function 
and rearranging, we get 
    Π =        {[ ( ) −  ( )]ℎ( ) ( ) −  ( )}      
 
 
                            (1.6) 
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                                             (1.7) 
where  ( ) is given by equation (1.5). Note that in the above objective function (1.6), 
we have a non-zero discount rate and finite planning horizon. A positive discount rate 
(r) can capture the uncertainty of revenue from future product sales. A finite planning 
horizon makes the optimization more realistic. It reflects the limited lifespan of a new 
product.   
The objective function given by equation (1.6) depends on  ( ),   ( ),  ( ) 
and   ( ). This makes the optimization problem an optimal control problem. To solve 
the optimal control problem, we can rewrite the objective function as follows: 
max
   ( ),  ( )














                                                                  






                                                                  
  ( )
  
=  ( )  ( )                                                                                      (1.9) 
  ( )
  
=  ( )  ( )                                                                                    (1.10) 
In the above formulation, the total discounted profit is a function of   ( ) and   ( ). 
  ( ) and   ( ) are equal to 
  ( )
 ( )
 and  
  ( )
 ( )
 respectively. These functions are known 
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as control functions.   ( ) governs that transition of state variable  ( ) through the 
transition equation stated in equation (1.9).   ( ) governs that transition of state 
variable  ( ) through the transition equation stated in equation (1.10). Note that this 
formulation is consistent with previous literature (Krishnan and Jain 2006, Krishnan 
et al. 1999). 
Due to the inclusion of a discounting term, this optimal control problem (1.8) 
can be difficult to solve. Please refer to the literature review in the previous section 
for a list of papers that encountered difficulty in solving a similar optimal control 
problem. As such, I propose an equivalent formulation of the problem that absorbs the 
discounting factor into the price and advertising expenditure functions. One way to 
interpret this new formulation is to think of it as a switch from profit discounting to 
demand discounting. In other words, instead of modelling a dollar received in the 
future as worth less than a dollar received today, we model a unit of demand received 
in the future as worth less than a unit of demand received today. It can be easily 
shown that under certain circumstances, the latter approach is equivalent to the former 
approach. In addition, we let the marginal cost of production be zero. This is to 
facilitate tractability. This assumption is consistent with previous literature (Krishnan 
and Jain 2006, Krishnan et al. 1999).   
The transformation that makes both formulations equivalent can be described via 
the following 5 equations: 
 ( ) =  ( )                                                                       (1.11) 
 ( ) =  ( )                                                                       (1.12) 
 ( ) = 0                                                                                (1.13) 
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   ( ) =   ( ) −                                                                  (1.14) 
   ( ) =   ( ) −                                                                  (1.15) 
Using the above equations (1.11) to (1.15), we can rewrite the optimal control 
problem (1.8) as follows: 
max
    ( ),   ( )
Π =     ( )ℎ( )   +     ( ) +     ( )  −  ( )   
 
 
                          (1.16) 

















  = 1 +     +     
  ( )
  
=  ( )  ( )                                                                                                         (1.17) 
  ( )
  
=  ( )  ( )                                                                                                         (1.18) 
In the above formulation, we have a k component. This k component is the demand 
discounting term for one period. We can compare this k component to the one period 
price discounting component (   ). When   = 0, both terms are equal to 1. When 
  > 0, the price discounting term is less than 1. An additional condition of    +    <
0 is required for the demand discounting term to be less than 1. What this additional 
condition says is that, if the demand is more sensitive to a 1 unit increase in rate of 
change in price than a 1 unit increase in rate of change in advertising, then the sign of 
the demand discounting term is the same as the sign of the price discounting term. 
This additional condition is required because a 1 unit increase in rate of change in 
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price can offset some, if not all, of the effect from a 1 unit increase in rate of change 
in advertising.   
The Hamiltonian can be written as, 
 ( ) =  ( )ℎ( ) ( ) −  ( ) +   ( ) ( )   ( ) +   ( ) ( )   ( ) 
 ( ) =  ( )ℎ( )  −  ( ) +    ( )[ ( )ℎ( )   +   ( ) ( )]
+    ( )[ ( )ℎ( )     ( ) ( )]                                        (1.19) 
where   ( ) and   ( ) are the costate variables. The necessary conditions to be 




  ( ) = −
  ( )
  
                                                                                    (1.20) 
  
  ( ) = −
  ( )
  
                                                                                   (1.21) 
  ( ) = 0                                                                                                 (1.22) 
  ( ) = 0                                                                                                 (1.23) 
Note that the terminal conditions (1.22) and (1.23) imply a zero salvage value. 
Another way to interpret these terminal conditions is to say that all profit beyond the 
planning horizon are discounted by a factor of ∞ . This assumption is consistent with 
previous literature (Krishnan and Jain 2006, Krishnan et al. 1999) and it reflects the 
limited lifespan of any new product.  
From equation (1.19), we can see that the Hamiltonian is linear in the control 
variables    ( ) and    ( ). For ease of reference, let 
  
∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   +   ( ) 




∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   +   ( )  
∗( )                                      (1.25) 
Assume that the control function    ( ) is bounded above by   ( ) −   and below by 
  ( ) −  . Furthermore, assume that the control function    ( ) is bounded above by 
  ( ) −   and below by   ( ) −  . Since the Hamiltonian is linear in the control 
variables, we can use the above assumptions to express    
∗( ) and    
∗( ) as follows: 
   
∗( ) =  
  ( ) −            
∗( ) > 0
  ( ) −            
∗( ) < 0
                                       (1.26)   
   
∗( ) =  
  ( ) −            
∗( ) > 0
  ( ) −            
∗( ) < 0
                                       (1.27) 
Note that equations (1.26) and (1.27) have the discount rate (r) term because of the 
transformation of the optimal control problem. It is easy to show that the bounds are 
without the discount rate (r) term prior to transformation. Here the bounds are given 
exogenously. We assume, without loss of generality, that these bounds remain 
constant for all t. This assumption is consistent with previous literature (Krishnan and 




   −            
∗( ) > 0
   −            
∗( ) < 0
                                       (1.28)   
   
∗( ) =  
   −            
∗( ) > 0
   −            
∗( ) < 0
                                       (1.29) 
All we have to do now is to trace the functions   
∗( ) and    
∗( ) and depending on 
their signs, set    
∗( ) and    
∗( ) to their upper or lower bound. In the next section, I 
will present the optimal dynamic pricing and advertising policies.     
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Joint Optimal Dynamic Pricing and Advertising Policy 
The main objective of this research is to derive conditions under which the 
optimal pricing and advertising trajectories can be jointly determined. Here I will 
present 4 propositions. The nature of these 4 propositions is vastly different from 
those presented in previous published research papers. Please refer to table 1 for a list 
of these published research papers. The first 2 propositions (1.1 and 1.2) are on the 
optimal pricing policy. Note that when conditions permit, these two propositions 
suggest that the characteristic of the optimal pricing policy can be determined 
independent of the optimal advertising policy. This is despite the fact that they were 
jointly optimized. The last two propositions (1.3 and 1.4) are on joint optimal pricing 
and advertising policy. These 4 propositions require only knowledge of the 
exogenously given model parameters. As such, they are much more helpful to the 
marketing manager that needs to make pricing and advertising decisions.  
When a firm increases advertising expenditure or decreases price, it has the 
effect of pulling a portion of future demand into the present period. When a firm 
decreases advertising expenditure or increases price, it has the effect of pushing a 
portion of current demand into the future. These two statements are helpful to the 
interpretation of the propositions. Note that the propositions have to be evaluated 
together with the following conditions. 
   < 0 <    
   < 0 <     
   < 0 <    
  > 0 
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These conditions are realistic, reasonable and self-evident. Please refer to appendix A 
for the proofs of the following propositions (proposition 1.1 to 1.4). 
Proposition 1.1: 
If     and    are such that 1 +     +      < 0, the optimal trajectory for price can 
be characterized by a monotonically decreasing function.  
Another way to look at this condition is, 
max
  ( )∈    ,   
 1 +     +     ( )  = 1 +     +      < 0                      (1.30) 
When    −   > 0, it means that the upper-bound for rate of increase in advertising is 
greater than the discount rate. This can be interpreted as a requirement for real rate of 
potential increase to be strictly positive. If    −   > 0, the above equation (1.30) 
implies that the 1-period demand discounting term (k) is negative. As such, there is 
strict preference for speeding up diffusion. In general, this condition is more likely to 
be satisfied when we have  
  
  
 > 1. This condition is a general requirement for price 
to be more effective than advertising in shifting demand. Under such circumstances, 
price becomes the dominant tool to shift demand. In the GBM paper (Bass et al. 
1994), they tested the model with color-TV data and found that price was more 
effective than advertising in shifting demand. As such, color-TV may be a good 
candidate to apply proposition 1.1. Note that the condition in proposition 1.1 is a 




If     and    are such that 1 +     +      > 0, the optimal trajectory for price can 
be characterized by an increase-decrease function.  
Another way to look at this condition is, 
   
  ( )∈    ,   
 1 +     +     ( )  = 1 +     +      > 0                      (1.31) 
Given   −    > 0, the above equation (1.31) can be rewritten as: 
  = 1 +     +     >      −     > 0                                                      (1.32) 
Condition (1.32) suggests the 1-period demand discounting term (k) is significantly 
positive. This suggests that there is significant preference for delaying demand 
saturation. The two tools to delay demand saturation are increase price and decrease 
advertising. From the condition in proposition 1.2, we can see that advertising cannot 
be decreased significantly. As such, there is a need to increase prices at the start. Note 
that the condition in proposition 1.2 is a sufficient but not necessary condition. 
Proposition 1.3: 
If     and    are such that 1 +     +      > 0 > 1 +     +      and  
  
  
 < 1, the 
optimal trajectory for price can be characterized by an increase-decrease function. In 
this case peak price happens at time greater than zero and greater than time of 
trough advertising. Trough advertising can happen at time zero or time greater than 
zero but less than time of peak price. 
Peak price refers to the highest price charged for the product during the 
planning horizon. Trough advertising refers to the lowest advertising expenditure for 
the product during the planning horizon. In general, the first condition in proposition 
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1.3 can be easily satisfied if advertising budget can be increased and decreased 
significantly. When the second condition in proposition 1.2 is satisfied, it suggests 
that advertising is more effective than price in shifting demand. As such, peak price 
comes after trough advertising. When both conditions are satisfied, advertising 
becomes the dominant tool for shifting demand. Note that trough advertising can 
happen at time zero or time greater than zero but less than time of peak price. The 
former is optimal when there is significant preference to speed up demand diffusion. 
The latter is optimal when there is some significant preference to delay demand 
saturation. Note that the conditions in proposition 1.3 are sufficient but not necessary 
conditions.       
Proposition 1.4: 
If     and    are such that 1 +     +      > 0,     −   > 0 and  
  
  
 < 1, the 
optimal trajectory for advertising can be characterized by a decrease-increase 
function and the optimal trajectory for price can be characterized by an increase-
decrease function. In this case peak price happens at time greater than zero and 
greater than time of trough advertising. Trough advertising happens at time greater 
than zero but less than time of peak price.   
Peak price refers to the highest price charged for the product during the 
planning horizon. Trough advertising refers to the lowest advertising expenditure for 
the product during the planning horizon. When advertising is more effective than 
price in shifting demand, peak price comes after trough advertising. On top of that, if 
there is significant preference for delaying demand saturation and advertising is not 
the dominant tool for shifting demand, it is optimal to supplement a decrease in 
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advertising with an increase in price. Note that the conditions in proposition 1.4 are 
sufficient but not necessary conditions.    
Limitations  
The model that I proposed does not take into consideration the following: (1) 
repeated purchase, (2) different generations of the same product launched within the 
planning horizon and (3) competition. The variable   is assumed to be known by 
management. It refers to the length of the planning horizon. In the above model, the 
market potential   does not vary with price or advertising. This assumption is 
reasonable when companies target a particular market segment with a specific new 
product. As such, within some range for price or advertising, the market potential 
does not change much. The only consideration is speed of adoption. This model that I 
propose could be criticized for being an open-loop system. In defense, all reviewed 
papers listed in table 1 are open-loop systems. Nevertheless, the model could be 
modified such that the planning horizon is separated into different intervals, each 
having a different set of parameters. In such a model, parameters are updated in 
intervals. The model that I propose can be treated as the model for one of these time 
intervals.  
Future Research and Conclusion:  
This research shows that there is much to be done in the area of new product 
diffusion. For example, we can extend the model to incorporate the effects of capacity 
constraint. We can also extend the model to consider multiple generations of the same 
product. A comparison of optimal pricing and advertising policy of the product that is 
about to be launched and the product that is about to be phased out could yield 
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interesting results. Other extensions include modeling the effects of advertising, prior 
to product launch, on parameters in new product diffusion models. 
We have taken an important step by deriving the joint optimal pricing and 
advertising policy for the diffusion of a new product. Although previous researchers 
have attempted the same problem, their solution is not as intuitively appealing. New 
product diffusion modeling occupies an important area in marketing research. This 
stream of research has been around for a long time and as a result, it is easy to read its 
age as an indication for lack of interesting areas for research. Questions that seem 















Global online advertising (ads) expenditure is forecasted to exceed global 
newspaper and magazines expenditures in 2015 (ZenithOptimedia1).  From the chart 
below, we can see that the forecast equates to about one fourth of global advertising 
expenditures. 
Figure 4: Share of Global Adspend by Medium (%) 
 
On average, companies will spend nearly half2 of their online marketing budget on 
sponsored search advertising. The rapid growth of sponsored search advertising is due 
to several unique advantages that it has over traditional mediums of advertising. First, 
it allows advertisers to better target their potential customers through the use of 
location dependant keywords. This means that not all customers that search with the 
same keyword will get the same sponsored search results. Only those that have 
potential and are genuinely interested in the product or service will receive the 
sponsored search results. Second, sponsored search advertising campaigns are 
accessible to all types of businesses. Businesses with a small marketing budget or low 
profit margin can also participate because the payment mechanism of online 






sponsored advertising is pay-per-click (PPC) and the maximum amount spent per day 
can be capped3. The PPC mechanism is different from the pay-per-impression (PPI) 
used in traditional advertising mediums (e.g. TV ads, Newspaper ads). The PPI 
mechanism usually involves a large upfront payment for a specific number of 
exposures. 
For businesses to be found online, they can engage in search engine 
optimization (SEO) and/or search engine marketing (SEM). SEO is the “process of 
getting traffic from the organic listings on search engines4.” SEM is the “process of 
gaining traffic by purchasing ads on search engines5.”  An example of sponsored and 
organic links can be found in the following picture. 
Figure 5: Organic and Sponsored Search Results (keyword = loans) 
 




 The next 2 charts6 show the di
of sponsored online advertising. As evident from the chart
ads on the right and bottom panel are relatively insignificant to the ones on the top 
panel. This provides some justification for differentiating the ads by rank alone and 
not a combination of rank and location.
Figure 
Figure 7
The latest Google search algorithm, for ranking organic search results, has 
over 2007 “ingredients” in its recipe. This algorithm changes from time to time and 
Google does not reveal the exact recipe to the SEO industry. As such, businesses th
have a long-term strategy 
others who do not. For search engines like Google and Bing, the proportion of total 





stribution of clicks with respect to the location and rank 
s, the click-through
 
6: Proportion of Ads vs. Proportion of Clicks 
 
: Distribution of Paid Clicks by Position and Rank 
 
for online marketing (e.g. SEO) tend to do better than 








online traffic originating from organic search can be as high as 94%8. In the short-run, 
businesses that rank poorly in the organic search results can rely on the PPC online 
sponsored advertising for visibility. However, in the long-run, consistent investment 
in SEO to improve the organic search ranking is important.  
In this research, I will explore the effects of organic search results on the 
optimal bidding strategies for online sponsored ads. The medium of analysis is a 
game-theoretic framework that has elements of competition, asymmetric market 
power and heterogeneous consumer knowledge.  In the model, there are two firms. 
The product or service offered by one firm is superior to the other. The firms have 
different profit margins and organic rankings. Both firms need to decide on whether 
they want to bid for sponsored ads space. If they do, they have to decide on the 
amount to bid. The informed consumers can identify the superior or inferior firm 
upon viewing the URL (uniform resource locator) in the search results. Informed 
consumers are those that are located more to the right of the awareness-interest-
desire-action (AIDA) purchase decision process continuum. These customers are 
more aware of the available brands and products. The uninformed consumers have to 
click the link to know. An example of the search heuristic of consumers and the firms’ 
payoffs will be given in later sections. The important elements that will drive the 
results are proportion of informed consumers, proportion of consumers that prefer 
organic links, competitive advantage in organic search ranking, search cost and profit 
margin.  
This model is similar to the model that is adopted in Jerath et al. (2011). In 
their paper, the only consideration is the bidding of sponsored ads space. There is no 
                                                     
8 Report from GroupM UK and Nielsen, published by eConsultancy, based on a sample of 1.4 
billion searches conducted by 28 million UK citizens in June 2011 
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consideration for a firm’s ranking in organic search results. As a consequence, they 
found that in equilibrium, “a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and 
obtain a position below it, yet it still obtains more clicks than the inferior firm”. They 
term this phenomenon as the “position paradox”.  
Although our model is similar to Jerath et al. (2011), we derived completely 
different results. Our results suggest that the position paradox phenomenon cannot 
occur when the superior firm has an accessible organic link. Instead of “position 
paradox”, we get “organic advantage”. Organic advantage is defined as a firm’s 
ability to rely solely on its better ranked and accessible organic link to attract online 
traffic when it is unable to outbid the other firm. When search cost is low, the firm’s 
organic link only has to be accessible to enjoy organic advantage. When search cost is 
high, the firm with the better ranked organic link can still enjoy organic advantage if 
it is unable to outbid the competing firm. When search cost is high and both firms 
have high profit margins, the firm with the better ranked organic link may be forced 
to bid and win the top sponsored ad position. In these cases, the competing firm (with 
the worse ranked organic link) is at least weakly better off by bidding above 
minimum bid. In addition, the firm with the better ranked organic link must have the 
ability to outbid the competing firm. Although both the superior and inferior firm can 
enjoy the organic advantage, the superior firm has an added option, when cost 
structures permit, of “attacking” when he has an organic link that is accessible and 
better ranked. When the inferior firm has an organic link that is accessible and better 
ranked, he only has the “defending” option. This asymmetry in options is due to the 
existence of informed consumers. On one hand, the inferior firm is not able to steal 
informed consumers away from the superior firm by having a better ranked sponsored 
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advertising link. On the other hand, the superior firm is able to steal uninformed 
consumers away from the inferior firm by having a better ranked sponsored 
advertising link. However, this ability to steal uninformed consumers is not without 
cost. The informed consumers who would otherwise visit the superior firm’s organic 
link will now have the added option to visit the superior firm’s sponsored link instead. 
This imposes additional cost on the superior firm. Our results suggest that it is 
important for the firm to consider both its absolute and relative advantage in organic 
search before bidding for sponsored advertising.  
Literature Review  
Prior work in traditional media (e.g. TV ads., Newspaper ads) has shown that 
the ordering of the message has significant influence on the ads’ degree of persuasion 
(Brunel and Nelson 2003). Furthermore, due to the cognitive cost of evaluating 
alternatives, consumers typically focus on a small subset of offering (Brynjolfsson et 
al. 2009 and Montgomery et al. 2004A and 2004B). Empirically, there is strong 
evidence that clicks decrease exponentially as the search ranking of links increase. 
This effect is evident in both sponsored and organic search results (Ghose and Yang 
2008, Ghose and Yang 2009, Yang and Ghose 2010, Agarwal et al. 2011). The 
findings on conversion rates are significantly different among authors (Ghose and 
Yang 2009, Agarwal et al. 2011). As such, I believe that the moderating factors for 
how conversion is affected by search ranking are still unclear. Animesh et al. (2010) 
looked at how adverse selection is affected by quality and concluded that adverse 
selection is a concern when quality is highly uncertain. Baye et al. (2013) looked at 
the impact of SEO on click-through rates. He suggests that SEO has positive direct 
and indirect effect on organic clicks. The indirect effect refers to the increase in 
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organic clicks as a result of being ranked more favorably by the search engine. Rutz 
et al. (2011) looked at the long-term impact of online sponsored ads. Their research 
suggests that a portion of unconverted clicks obtained via sponsored ads later return 
to the site directly (e.g. bookmark, type URL). A significant portion of this 
subsequent visits results in conversion. As such, a significant portion of the cost of 
acquiring these customers can be recovered in the long-run. Taylor (2013) looked at 
the incentives for a search engine host to optimize the quality of the search results. 
His research shows that search engine using sponsored ads for revenue have an 
incentive to not optimize the quality of the organic search results. This result is 
dependent on consumer’s loyalty towards the search engine.  
Table 2: Summary of Literature Review 





Adverse selection is a concern when potential consumers are highly uncertain 
about product quality. 




SEO has positive direct and indirect effect on organic clicks. SEO is defined 
as investment in quality and brand awareness of website.  
The indirect effect refers to the increase in organic clicks as a result of being 
ranked more favourably by the search engine.  




Number of entrants positively affects click-volume.  
Number of entrants has an inverse-U relationship with mean decay factor.  
Number of entrants has a negative and convex relationship with the mean 
value-per-click of a keyword. 





Click-through rates and conversion rates are highest at the top. 
Profit can be higher in the middle because Cost-per-click decays faster than 








The click-through rate of organic listings has a positive interdependence with 
the click-through rate of sponsored listings. 
If both sponsored and organic listings are present, the click-through rate, 
conversion rate and revenue are higher than if only the organic listing is 
present. 




Click-through rates decreases with position 
Conversion rates increases with position 




A portion of unconverted clicks obtained via sponsored ads later return to the 
site directly (e.g. bookmark, type URL). A significant portion of this 
subsequent visits results in conversion. A significant portion of the cost of 
acquiring these customers can be recovered.  
Taylor (2013) Analytical 
Model 
Search engine using sponsored ads for revenue have an incentive to not 
optimize the quality of the organic search results. This result is dependent on 











Investigated the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism, 
used by search engines to sell online advertising.  
This mechanism may look similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 
mechanism but its properties are very different.  
Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in 
dominant strategies and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. 
They proposed the locally envy-free characteristic of the equilibrium 
strategies. An equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game induced by GSP is 
locally envy-free if a player cannot improve his payoff by exchanging bids 
with the player ranked one position above him. 




A superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position 
below it, yet it still obtains more clicks than the inferior firm 
 
Most theoretical papers (Edelman et al. 2007, Katona and Sarvary 2010, 
Varian 2007) focus on the optimal bidding strategies for advertisers. Edelman et al. 
(2007) investigated the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism, 
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used by search engines to sell online advertising. This mechanism may look similar to 
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism but its properties are very different. 
Edelman et al. (2007) concluded that, unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally 
does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth-telling is not an 
equilibrium of GSP. In general, the number of Nash Equilibriums in such games 
(GSP) can be very large. In order to narrow down the selection, Edelman et al. (2007) 
proposed the locally envy-free characteristic of the equilibrium strategies. An 
equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game induced by GSP is locally envy-free if a 
player cannot improve his payoff by exchanging bids with the player ranked one 
position above him. Their results are similar to those in Varian (2007). Varian (2007) 
showed that the locally envy-free equilibrium yields the same bids as the lower bound 
of the range of Nash equilibrium bids.    
The paper that is closest to this research is Jerath et al. (2011). In that paper, 
the only consideration is the bidding of sponsored ads space. They found that in 
equilibrium, “a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a 
position below it, yet it still obtains more clicks than the inferior firm”. In this 
research, I have added the consideration of organic search results. From the previous 
section, we know that the proportion of total online traffic originating from organic 
search can be as high as 94%. Furthermore, the organic link(s) of a firm act as 
substitute(s) for the sponsored links. As such, I feel that the considerations of both 
organic and sponsored search results are crucial to understanding the optimal bidding 




In my model, there are 2 firms. These two firms are denoted by S and I. These 
2 firms compete for sponsored search advertising position. This competition is over 
search keywords. The firm with the winning bid gets a more favorable position on the 
sponsored search list. The superior firm (denoted  ) offers a product that is of higher 
quality than the inferior firm (denoted  ). Although we use the term product, this 
model is equally applicable to services. The net utility of consuming the superior and 
inferior firms’ product are   +   and   respectively. The quality premium is denoted 
as  . The per unit profit margin of the superior and inferior firm are denoted as     
and    respectively. Without loss of generality, the mass of consumers is normalized 
to 1. All consumers know that there are 2 firms in the market. In addition, they also 
know the net utility of consuming each firm’s product. A portion   of consumers can 
match the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) and description on the search listing 
(both organic and sponsored) with the superior and inferior firm. The remaining 
portion 1 −   cannot. We term the first type of consumer as informed and the second 
type of consumer as uninformed. Consumers also have preferences for organic and 
sponsored listings. On average, the probability of choosing an organic link and 
sponsored link are   and 1 −   respectively. After evaluating a link, the consumer 
will come to know the match of the product. The probability of match is denoted as  . 
Match refers to the aggregate of factors such as delivery speed, delivery charges and 
availability of stock. Another way to look at match is the non-quality or non-technical 
specification of the product offering. Probability of match is assumed to be the same 
across consumer types, link types and link rank on the search list. From the empirical 
literature, the concept of match is captured by conversion rate. Another way to 
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describe match is purchase conditional on click. As mentioned in previous sections, 
the moderating factors for how conversion is affected by search ranking are still 
unclear. For now, it seems adequate to model match this way.  
There are 2 ways to categorize a firm’s online link. The first way is by type 
and the second way is by accessibility. When categorized by type, the firm’s link can 
either be of type organic or sponsored. When categorized by accessibility, the firm’s 
link can either be of type accessible or inaccessible. Sponsored links are by default 
accessible due to its placement on the search engine query results page (refer to figure 
5 for an example). Organic links can be either accessible or inaccessible depending on 
its placement on the search engine query results page. All accessible links have a 
search cost of 0 if it is visited on the first click and a search cost of    if it is visited 
on the second click. This difference in search costs between the first and second click 
reflects the increasing cost of evaluating more than one link. Since we are only 
concerned about the difference in search cost between the first and second click, 
normalizing the search cost of the first click to 0 is both appropriate and convenient. 
Another way to rationalize the 0 search cost of the first click is to say that it is already 
absorbed into the net utility of consuming the two products. If it is significant, the 
consumer would not initiate the search in the first place. All inaccessible links have a 
search cost of     which is high enough to not warrant a visit. Refer to table 3 for the 
relationship between search cost and expected utility. The five scenarios listed in 
table 3 covers all scenarios. This differentiation will become necessary when we 
proceed to solve for equilibrium bids. Note that for all 5 scenarios, we have  (  +
 ) <     and    <    . The first inequality is a consequence of inaccessibility. More 
on search cost will be given in the search heuristics section.    
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Table 3: Relationship between search cost and net utility 
Scenario Search Cost and Net Utility Relationship 
1    ≤     ( ,  ) ≤  (  +  ) <     
2     ( ,  ) <    ≤     ( ,  ) <       ,  >   
3     ( , ) <    ≤     ( ,  ) <       ,   >   
4     ( ,  ) ≤     ( ,  ) <    ≤  (  +  ) <     
5     ( ,  ) ≤     ( ,  ) <  (  +  ) <    =     
 
Let   ,  denote the relative position of firm  ′  type   link. Note that    ,  ∈ {1,2,3}, 
  ∈ { ,  } and   ∈ { ,  } .Please refer to table 4, 5 and 6 for their more detailed 
descriptions. 
Table 4: Notations for i 
Notation Definitions 
  =   Superior Firm 
  =   Inferior Firm 
 
Table 5: Notations for t 
Notation Definitions 
  =   Organic Link 
  =   Sponsored Link 
 
 
Table 6: Notation for Relative Position 
Notation Definitions 
  ,  = 1 Firm i’s link of type t is rank ahead of competitor link of type t 
  ,  = 2 Firm i’s link of type t is rank below competitor link of type t 
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  ,  = 3 Rank of Firm i’s link of type t is immaterial due to inaccessibility 
 
The relative position of the superior firm’s organic link with respect to the inferior 
firm’s organic link can give rise to 6 unique scenarios. Four of these scenarios are 
detailed in table 7. 
 
Table 7: Relative Position and Accessibility Scenarios for Organic Links 
 
Scenarios 
One Two Three Four 
  ,  1 2 1 3 
  ,  2 1 3 1 
 
In scenario one, both firms’ organic links are accessible and the superior firm’s 
organic is better ranked. In scenario two, both firms’ organic links are accessible and 
the inferior firm’s organic is better ranked. In scenario three, only the superior firm’s 
organic link is accessible. In scenario four, only the inferior firm’s organic links is 
accessible. The fifth and sixth scenarios are not listed because they have been tackled 
in previous research (Jerath et al. 2011). These are the scenarios where both firm’s 
organic links are inaccessible. For ease of reference, we will denote the relative 
position and accessibility scenarios as    (   ∈ {1,2,3,4}) and the search cost scenarios 
as    (   ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}). Furthermore, let the cases that have to be analyzed be 





I assume that the informed consumer will always start their search (evaluation) 
by clicking the superior firm’s link. If the result of the evaluation is a match, they will 
purchase from the first firm. If there is no match, he will only continue to search if the 
expected utility of clicking the inferior firm’s link is non-negative. In table 8, we have 
listed the different scenarios regarding the availability of links and their respective 
proportion of first clicks for informed consumers. Note that the availability of the 
superior firm’s organic links is exogenously given while the availability of sponsored 
links is derived endogenously. More about this endogenous process will be given in 
later paragraphs. 
Table 8: Informed Consumers’ Proportion of Clicks vs. Availability of Links 
 Availability of Links Proportion of Clicks 
 Organic Link Sponsored Link Organic Link Sponsored Link 
Scenario 1 Yes Yes     (1 −  ) 
Scenario 2 Yes No   0 
Scenario 3 No Yes 0   
Scenario 4 No No 0 0 
 
For the uninformed consumer, he will start evaluation by clicking the first 
organic or sponsored link. Since the consumer is uninformed, these two links may or 
may not belong to the same firm. There is ample support in the empirical literature 
that suggests that clicks decrease exponentially as the search ranking of links increase. 
As such, I believe that above mentioned search heuristic for uninformed consumers is 
a good approximation of their behavior. Having said so, I do recognize that such 
behavior may not be optimal. Nevertheless, literature in behavioral economics has 
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documented many instances of consumer behaviors that are not characteristic of 
perfect strategic foresight. Similar to informed consumers, the uninformed consumer 
will click the second link if he believes that the expected utility of clicking the second 
link is non-negative. Similar to the informed consumers, search costs for the first and 
second click are 0 and    respectively. The probability of the uninformed consumer 
clicking the second link is higher if the first link he clicked on is that of the inferior 
firm. Note that a situation of no match is not required for the evaluation of the second 
link. This is possible because the first link he evaluated could be that of the inferior 
firm. A general assumption I made, that is applicable to all consumer types, is that 
once a link is evaluated, revisits in the same session have zero cost. This assumption 
is reasonable because the link is usually in the search history or is still in one of the 
browser’s tabs. Even if revaluation is necessary, the cost is likely to be minimal. In 
table 9, we have listed the difference scenarios regarding the availability of links and 
their respective proportion of first clicks for uninformed consumers. 
Table 9: Uninformed Consumers’ Proportion of Clicks vs. Availability of Links 
 Availability of Links Proportion of Clicks 
 Organic Link Sponsored Link Organic Link Sponsored Link 
Scenario 1 Yes Yes (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Scenario 2 Yes No (1 −  ) 0 
Scenario 3 No Yes 0 (1 −  ) 




Bidding and Ranking Process 
Firms can improve their chances of being found online by bidding for 
sponsored advertising. These online auctions are hosted by the search engines (e.g. 
Google, Yahoo). The mechanism for payment may be either pay-per-impression or 
pay-per-click. These days, all major search engines have switched to pay-per-click. 
As such, it is unnecessary to evaluate the different game scenarios with the pay-per-
impression mechanism. The firms’ bids are evaluated and ranked in real time. The 
firm with the highest bid wins the top position and commits to a pay-per-click equal 
to the second highest bid. The firm with the second highest bid wins the second 
position and commits to a pay-per-click equal to the third highest bid. The firm that 
wins the last position either pays the highest losing bid or the minimum bid.     
Game Stages 
The game is modeled in two stages. In the first stage, the firms submit their 
bids simultaneously and the search engine (e.g. Google, Bing) ranks their bids from 
highest to lowest. For convenience of reference, we will introduce some notations for 
bids. Let the actual cost-per-click for firm with highest winning bid be denoted as   . 
Let the optimal bid for firm i be denoted as   
∗. Let the minimum bid be denoted as  . 
In the game that we are studying, there are only two firms. Note that the firms do not 
have to explicitly decide to join the bidding process. If a firm’s optimal bid is below 
the minimum bid set by the search engine, it implies that the firm cannot do better by 
being listed in the sponsored section of the online search results. As such, it is as good 




Equilibrium Concept: Locally-envy-free 
The solution concept chosen for our study is the locally-envy-free 
equilibrium (Edelman et al. 2007, Varian 2007). Note that Varian (2007) has shown 
that any locally-envy-free equilibrium must also be a Nash Equilibrium. Due to the 
nature of the game, there is usually more than one Nash Equilibrium. As such, a 
selection mechanism is necessary. In essence, the selection technique amounts to 
asking the following:  
“What is the highest bid I can set so that if I happen to exceed the 
bid of the agent above me and I move up by 1 slot, I am sure to make 
at least as much profit as I make now (Varian, 2007)?” 
The optimal bid(s) for sponsored advertising for the above question is the same as the 
optimal bid for a locally-envy-free equilibrium proposed by Edelman et al. (2007). As 
an alternative, Varian (2007) suggests that the firm could act more defensively and 
ask the following question: 
“What is the highest breakeven bid that would not induce the agent 
ahead of me to move down (Varian, 2007)?” 
The optimal bids resulting from the above two questions determine the upper and 
lower bounds for the range of Nash bids. Even though any bid in the range is a Nash 
bid, Varian9 (2007) suggests that, “as a matter of practice, it seems to me that the first 
argument is compelling”.  
  
                                                     
9 Chief Economist at Google 
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Table 10: Example from Varian (2007) 
Position Value Bid Price CTR 
1          =       
2          =       
3          =       
4          =       
5       0 0 
 
 I will now use table 10 (above) to illustrate the solution concept of a locally 
envy-free equilibrium. Note that table 10 is borrowed from Varian (2007). Note that 
all equations and inequalities for the rest of this paragraph are also borrowed from 
Varian (2007). In this setup there are 5 agents. Each agent has a valuation (  ) for 
value per click. There are 4 positions with positive click-through-rates (CTR). In 
equilibrium, the agent assigned to position s does not want to move down by one slot 
and the agent in position s+1 does not want to move up by one slot. It can be easily 
shown that not wanting to move up or down by one slot implies not wanting to move 
up or down by more than one slot. These 2 conditions can be written as: 
(   −   )   ≥ (   −     )     
(     −     )     ≥ (     −   )   
From the 2 inequalities above, we can derive an upper bound and a lower bound for 
the set of Nash equilibrium bids.  
    (     −   ) +        ≥        ≥   (     −   ) +        
To select an equilibrium, we ask the following question: What is the highest bid I can 
set so that if I happen to move up by one slot, I am sure to make at least as much 




worst case pro it moving up   = pro it now 
(   −   
∗)     = (   −     
∗ )   
Solving for   
∗ gives us 
  
∗     =   (     −   ) +        
 
The answer to this question is the lower bound for the set of Nash Equilibrium Bids. 
In table 11, I have provided some numbers for Value and CTR to illustrate the locally 
envy-free equilibrium.     
Table 11: Example from Varian (2007) with Value and CTR 
Position Value Bid Price CTR 
1 10       =    0.55 
2 8       =    0.25 
3 6       =    0.15 
4 4       =    0.05 
5 2    0 0 
 
  
∗(0.05) = 2(0.05− 0) 
  
∗ = 2 
  
∗(0.15) = 4(0.15− 0.05) + 2(0.05) 
  
∗ = 3.33… 
  
∗(0.25) = 6(0.25− 0.15) + 4(0.15) 
  
∗ = 4.8 
… = … 
 
In the above example, the optimal bid of the fifth agent is equal to his valuation. The 





∗     =   (     −   ) +        
Results:  
The workings for all results are provided in appendix B. The solution process 
always begins by deriving the baseline expected profit for both the superior and 
inferior firm. In this baseline scenario, both firms do not bid for sponsored advertising. 
Next, we check the scenario where only one of the two firms bid above the minimum 
bid and win the top sponsored link position. In these scenarios, we derive both the 
optimal bids and the supporting (or violation) conditions. For example, suppose in 
one scenario we assume that the superior firm is listed (in sponsored section) and the 
inferior firm is not. In this case, the violation condition is the condition under which 
the superior firm’s optimal bid is below the minimum bid. Next, we check the 
scenario where both firms bid above the minimum bid. In these scenarios, we derive 
both the optimal bids and the supporting (or violation) conditions. For example, 
suppose in one scenario we assume that the superior firm is listed (in sponsored 
section) ahead of the inferior firm. In this case, the violation condition is the condition 
under which the superior firm’s optimal bid is below the minimum bid. Next, we will 
compare the expected profit of firms across scenarios and derive the conditions under 
which various bidding strategies are optimal.  
In the following sections, I will proceed to present the results for the 20 cases 
(   ,  ) described in previous sections. Note that all optimal bids below minimum bid 
are set to zero. Note also that rank refers to sponsored ads rank. When we calculate 
the proportion of clicks for the inferior firm, we do not count those clicks that result 
in preference match but no immediate purchase. This can happen when the 
uninformed consumer clicks on the inferior firm’s link first. He may continue the 
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search, by clicking the superior firm’s link, even when there is preference match with 
the inferior firm’s product. If we include these clicks, it may lead to double-counting 
when the uninformed consumer revisits the inferior firm’s link upon getting no 
preference match with the superior firm’s product.  
In all 20 cases, we avoid the scenario where both firms bid above the 
minimum bid and bid the same value. In such cases, the search engine will assign the 
ads positions randomly to each firm. We avoid such cases because they bring 
unnecessary burden to the analysis.  
Case 1:    ,   =   ,  
The only optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The 
results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 12: Case 1 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bids Rank Proportion of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 −   
 
Case 2:    ,   =   ,  
If (1 −  )    ≥  , the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. 
The results are summarized in the table below.  
Table 13: Case 2 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bids Rank Proportion of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 




If (1 −  )    <   ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 14: Case 2 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bids Rank Proportion of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 3:    ,   =   ,  
If the following condition is satisfied, 
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
≥   
the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 15: Case 3 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm 
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
 
In some cases, the superior firm can still make positive profits by bidding above the 
minimum bid but he is better off by not bidding at all. Note that for Case 3, both firms 
prefer not bidding to bidding and getting second. For some cost conditions in 
outcome 1, the superior firm may have the incentive and ability to outbid the inferior 
firm. When that happens, the inferior firm will choose not to bid followed by the 
superior firm doing the same. Such scenarios result in an “unstable equilibrium”.  




[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<   
the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The results 
are summarized in the table below.  
Table 16: Case 3 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. (1 −  ) 
 
Case 4:    ,   =   ,  
If the following 3 conditions are satisfied,  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  >     
(1 −  )     >   
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. For the superior firm to have an incentive to outbid the inferior firm, 
the expected profit from winning the bid must not only be better than the expected 
profit from getting second position, it must also be better than not bidding. Unlike 
Case 3 Outcome 1, there are cost conditions where such an equilibrium is stable. The 
results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 17: Case 4 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  1 1 
Inferior Firm     2 0 
 
If the following 2 conditions are satisfied,  
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(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  <     
    ≥   
the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 18: Case 4 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid  Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm     1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. 
The results are summarized in the table below.  
Table 19: Case 4 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 5:    ,   =   ,  
If the following 3 conditions are satisfied,  
(1 −  )    +    >     
(1 −  )    >   
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 20: Case 5 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )    +    1 1 
Inferior Firm     2 0 
 
If the following 2 conditions are satisfied,  
(1 −  )    +    <     
    ≥   
the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 21: Case 5 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   +  (1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm     1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. 
The results are summarized in the table below.  
Table 22: Case 5 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 6:    ,   =   ,   
The only optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The 
results are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 23: Case 6 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clocks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A.  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) 
 
Case 7:    ,   =   ,   
The only optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The 
results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 24: Case 7 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clocks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. (1 −  ) 
 
Case 8:    ,   =   ,   
If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     ≥ [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>
(1 −  )     + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
(1 −   )
 
the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 25: Case 8 outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 
(1 −  )    
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 




Similar to Case 3 Outcome 1, both firms prefer not to bid than to bid and get second. 
However, since the superior firm has a worse ranked organic link, it behaves 
somewhat like the inferior firm in Case 3.  
If the following condition is satisfied,  
(1 −  )     < [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The results 
are summarized in the table below. 
Table 26: Case 8 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A.  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) 
 
Note that if  
(1 −  )     ≥ [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
(1 −  )     ≥ (1 −   )  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<




then we will not have a “staple equilibrium”. The first two conditions say that both 
firms are able to bid above minimum bid. The third condition says that the inferior 
firm can outbid the superior firm. If we start with the situation where both firms do 
not bid, then the superior firm will have an incentive to bid above minimum bid. As a 
consequence, the inferior firm will have an incentive to outbid the superior firm. If 
that happens, the superior firm and inferior firm will consecutively choose not to bid.  
Case 9:    ,   =   ,   
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If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     ≥ [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
    <   
the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 27: Case 9 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 
(1 −  )    
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>     
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and for the superior firm to be 
placed ahead.  The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 28: Case 9 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior 
Firm 
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior 
Firm 
    2  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following condition is satisfied,  
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(1 −  )     < [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 
the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The results 
are summarized in the table below. 
Table 29: Case 9 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 −   
 
Note that if  
(1 −  )     ≥ [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
    ≥   
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<     
 
then we will not have a “staple equilibrium”. The first two conditions say that both 
firms are able to bid above minimum bid. The third condition says that the inferior 
firm can outbid the superior firm. If we start with the situation where both firms do 
not bid, then the superior firm will have an incentive to bid above minimum bid. As a 
consequence, the inferior firm will have an incentive to outbid the superior firm. If 
that happens, the superior firm and inferior firm will consecutively choose not to bid.  
 
Case 10:    ,   =   ,   
If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )    ≥   
    <   
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the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below.  
Table 30: Case 10 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )    1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm 0  N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )    >   
(1 −  )    +    >     
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 31: Case 10 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )    +    1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm     2  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following condition is satisfied,  
(1 −  )    <   
the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. The results 
are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 32: Case 10 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   




Note that if  
(1 −  )    ≥   
    ≥   
(1 −  )    +    <     
 
then we will not have a “staple equilibrium”. The first two conditions say that both 
firms are able to bid above minimum bid. The third condition says that the inferior 
firm can outbid the superior firm. If we start with the situation where both firms do 
not bid, then the superior firm will have an incentive to bid above minimum bid. As a 
consequence, the inferior firm will have an incentive to outbid the superior firm. If 
that happens, the superior firm and inferior firm will consecutively choose not to bid. 
 
Case 11:    ,   =   ,   
If (1 −  )    ≥ [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  , the inferior firm is the only firm 
that bids above minimum bid. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 33: Case 11 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 
(1 −  )   
 (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )
  1 (1 −  ) 
 
If (1 −  )    < [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  , the optimal strategy is for both 




Table 34: Case 11 Outcome 2 
 Optimal bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 12:    ,   =   ,   
If (1 −  )    ≥   , the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. 
The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 35: Case 12 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm (1 −  )    1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
If (1 −  )    <   , the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 36: Case 12 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 13:    ,   =   ,   
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  >     
(1 −  )     >    
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 37: Case 13 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  1 1 
Inferior Firm     2 (1 −  ) 
 
If the following 2 conditions are satisfied,  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  <     
    ≥   
the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 38: Case 13 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm     1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. 
The results are summarized in the table below. 
  
Table 39: Case 13 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 14:    ,   =   ,   
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  >     
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(1 −  )     >    
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 40: Case 14 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of 
Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  1 1 
Inferior Firm     2 (1 −  ) 
If the following 2 conditions are satisfied,  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  <     
    ≥   
the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 41: Case 14 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm     1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. 
The results are summarized in the table below.  
Table 42: Case 14 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
 
Case 15:    ,   =   ,   
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
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(1 −  )    +    >     
(1 −  )    >     
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 43: Case 15 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm (1 −  )    +    1 1 
Inferior Firm     2 0 
 
If the following two conditions are satisfied,  
(1 −  )    +    <     
    ≥   
the inferior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 44: Case 15 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A.   +  (1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm     1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored advertising. 
The results are summarized in the table below.  
Table 45: Case 15 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 1 




Case 16:    ,   =   ,   
If     ≥  ,  the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The 
results are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 46: Case 16 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm     1 1 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. (1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 47: Case 16 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
 
Case 17:    ,   =   ,   
If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
    ≥   
(1 −  )    <   
the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 48: Case 17 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm     1 1 




If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
    ≥   
(1 −  )    >   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the inferior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. In addition, if   < 1, 
position paradox will occur.  
Table 49: Case 17 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm   2 1 
Inferior Firm (1 −  )    1 (1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 50: Case 17 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
 
Case 18:    ,   =   ,   
If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
>
(1 −  )     + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
(1 −   )
 
    ≥   
the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
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Table 51: Case 18 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm     1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A.  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
<






    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the inferior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. In addition, if   > 0.5, 
position paradox will occur. 
Table 52: Case 18 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
 2 [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm 
(1 −  )     + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
(1 −   )
 1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 53: Case 18 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
 
Case 19:    ,   =   ,   
If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
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    ≥   
    <   
the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 54: Case 19 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm     1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm 0  N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
>     
    >   
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 55: Case 19 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior 
Firm 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior 
Firm 
    2  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 − )(1 −   )]
<     
    ≥   
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    >   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the inferior firm to be 




position paradox will occur. 
Table 56: Case 19 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior 
Firm 
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
 2 [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior 
Firm 
    1 (1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 57: Case 19 Outcome 4 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
 
Case 20:    ,   =   ,   
If the following two conditions are satisfied, 
    ≥   
    <   
the superior firm is the only firm that bids above minimum bid. The results are 
summarized in the table below. 
Table 58: Case 20 Outcome 1 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm      1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
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Inferior Firm 0  N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )(1 −  )    +   
  + (1 −  )(1 −  )
>     
    >   
    ≥   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the superior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 59: Case 20 Outcome 2 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 
(1 −  )(1 −  )    +   
  + (1 −  )(1 −  )
 1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm     2  (1 −  ) 
 
If the following three conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )(1 −  )    +   
  + (1 −  )(1 −  )
<     
    ≥   
    >   
it is optimal for both firms to bid above minimum bid and the inferior firm to be 
placed ahead. The results are summarized in the table below. In addition, if   > 0.5, 
position paradox will occur. 
Table 60: Case 20 Outcome 3 
 Optimal Bid Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 
(1 −  )(1 −  )    +   
  + (1 −  )(1 −  )
 2   
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Inferior Firm     1 (1 −  ) 
 
If     <  ,  the optimal strategy is for both firms to not bid for sponsored 
advertising. The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 61: Case 20 Outcome 4 
 Optimal Bids Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm 0 N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm 0 N.A. 1 
 
Analysis of Results 
A firm enjoys organic advantage when it has a better ranked organic link and 
has no incentive to bid for sponsored ad space. When search cost is low enough, the 
firm with the better ranked organic link can always enjoy organic advantage. There is 
no incentive to bid for sponsored ad position because all uninformed consumers that 
clicked on the inferior firm’s sponsored link first will continue search by clicking the 
superior firm’s organic link. As such, if the superior firm has the better ranked 
organic link and search cost is low, he can afford to be “the second click”. On the 
flipped side, if the inferior firm has the better ranked organic link and search cost is 
low, there is no benefit in being “the first click”. When search cost is high, the firm 
with the better ranked organic link can still enjoy organic advantage if it cannot 
outbid the firm with the worse ranked organic link. When search cost is high, the firm 
with the worse ranked organic link may be able to force a higher bid out of the firm 
with the better ranked organic link. This can happen if both firms have the incentive 
to bid above minimum bid and the firm with the better ranked organic link has the 
incentive to outbid his opponent. In general, this is more likely to happen when both 
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firms have superior profit margins. The definitions for low and high search cost (refer 
to tables 62 to 65) vary across accessibility scenarios (  ).   
 A summary of the possible equilibrium bids for Case 1 to 5 is given in table 
62. For Case 1 to 5, both firm’s organic links are accessible and the superior firm’s 
organic link is better ranked. 
Table 62: Summary of Equilibrium Outcomes for Cases 1 to 5 
    ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,  
  >   
∗,   >   
∗    
   N 
  
∗ >   >   
∗      
  













∗ >        
Y = Equilibrium bids exist 
N = Equilibrium bids exist if minimum bid is not reduced significantly 
(empty) = No equilibrium bids exist 
L = Low search cost 
H = High search cost 
OA = Organic Advantage 
NOA = No organic advantage 
 
For this set of cases, there are no scenarios where the position paradox appears. In 
these cases, there always exists some cost structure where the superior firm can enjoy 
organic advantage (   
  ,    
  ). When search cost is high, the inferior firm may be able 
to force a higher bid out of the superior firm. In these cases (    
  ), there is no cost 
for the inferior firm because it gets no clicks. In addition, the superior firm gets the 
same proportion of clicks but has to pay for some now. This is compared to when 
both firms do not bid above minimum bid.   
A summary of the possible equilibrium bids for Case 6 to 10 is given in table 
63. For Case 6 to 10, both firm’s organic links are accessible and the inferior firm’s 
organic link is better ranked.  
66 
 
Table 63: Summary of Equilibrium Outcomes for Cases 6 to 10 
    ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,  
  >   
∗,   >   
∗    
      
   N 
  
∗ >   >   





∗ >   >   
∗      
  
∗ >   





∗ >        
Y = Equilibrium bids exist 
N = Equilibrium bids exist if minimum bid is not reduced significantly 
(empty) = No equilibrium bids exist 
L = Low search cost 
H = High search cost 
OA = Organic Advantage 
NOA = No organic advantage 
 
For this set of cases, there are no scenarios where the position paradox appears. In 
these cases, there always exists some cost structure where the inferior firm can enjoy 
organic advantage (   
  ,    
  ). When search cost is high, the inferior firm may be 
weakly better-off if it bids above minimum bid and lower than superior firm. (    
  ). 
Note that there is no scenario where both firms bid above minimum bid and the 
inferior firm is placed ahead. There is no incentive for the superior firm to be placed 
behind the inferior firm for sponsored ads because the same amount of clicks cost 
more. This is compared to when only the inferior firm bids above the minimum bid. 
A summary of the possible equilibrium bids for Case 11 to 15 is given in 




Table 64: Summary of Equilibrium Outcomes for Cases 11 to 15 
    ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,  
  >   
∗,   >   
∗ N 
  
∗ >   >   
∗      
  















∗ >        
Y = Equilibrium bids exist 
N = Equilibrium bids exist if minimum bid is not reduced significantly 
(empty) = No equilibrium bids exist 
L = Low search cost 
H = High search cost 
OA = Organic Advantage 
NOA = No organic advantage 
 
For this set of cases, there are no scenarios where the position paradox appears. In 
these cases, there always exists some cost structure where the superior firm can enjoy 
organic advantage (   
  ,    
  ). When search cost is high, the inferior firm may be able 
to force a higher bid out of the superior firm. In some of these cases (    
  ,    >
 max ( ,  ) ), there is no cost for the inferior firm because it gets no clicks. In 
addition, the superior firm gets the same proportion of clicks but has to pay for some 
now. This is compared to when both firms do not bid above minimum bid. 
A summary of the possible equilibrium bids for Case 16 to 20 is given in 
table 65. For Case 16 to 20, only the inferior firm’s organic link is accessible. In 4 out 
of 5 cases (i.e. case 17 to 20), there are cost structures that permit the appearance of 
position paradox. This suggests that position paradox cannot happen when the 
superior firm has an accessible organic link. This organic link does not have to be 
better ranked than the inferior firm’s organic link.  
From the above analysis, it is clear that the firm’s optimal sponsored ad 
position depends on the accessibility and rank of the firm’s organic links. In addition, 
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the analysis also suggests that position paradox appears because the superior firm 
does not have an accessible organic link.  
Table 65: Summary of Equilibrium Outcomes for Cases 16 to 20 
    ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,     ,   =   ,  
  >   
∗,   >   
∗ N 
  








∗ >   >   
∗      
  
∗ >   










Y = Equilibrium bids exist 
N = Equilibrium bids exist if minimum bid is not reduced significantly 
(empty) = No equilibrium bids exist 
L = Low search cost 
H = High search cost 
OA = Organic Advantage 
NOA = No organic advantage 
PP = Position Paradox 
   
Extension: More than 2 Firms 
In this model extension (refer to appendix B Model extension for the 
working), there are 3 firms. These firms are denoted by  ,     and   . The superior 
firm (denoted by S) offers a product that is of higher quality than the inferior firms 
(denoted by    and   ). Inferior firm    is the only firm without an accessible organic 
link. The superior firm has a better ranked organic link than firm   . All accessible 
links have a search cost of 0 if it is visited on the first click and a search cost of    if 
it is visited on the second click. We assume that the consumer will not make a third 
evaluation. This assumption is robust with respect to empirical findings. With this 
setting and search condition    = 3, we derived the conditions where the only firm 
that has an incentive and ability to bid above minimum bid is firm   . By assuming 
that the number of accessible organic links is 2, this result can be easily adapted to fit 
n firms (refer to appendix B Model extension for the working). This suggests that our 
69 
 
findings are robust with respect to number of firms. We will not illustrate other 
scenarios as that is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, this example 
should be sufficient to illustrate our point. 
Possible Extension: Perfectly Rational Uninformed Consumers 
The conversion of bounded rationality to fully rationality is covered by Jerath 
et al. (2009). In essence, they suggested a set of prior believes for the rational 
consumers such that their click behaviour does not differ from those characterized by 
bounded rationality. In this paper, we can do the same. Let us take Case 13 outcome 1 
as an example. In this case, the superior firm is the only firm that has an accessible 
organic link. Both firms have the ability and incentive to bid above minimum bid. 
Furthermore, the superior firm can outbid the inferior firm. For the rational 
uninformed consumer to click on the organic link on the first click, they must believe 
that superior firm has a better ranked organic link. For the rational uninformed 
consumer to click on sponsored link for the first click, they must believe that both 
firms have the ability and incentive to bid and the superior firm can outbid the inferior 
firm. Since these uninformed consumers can see 2 sponsored links prior to making 
the first click, they can assume that both firms have the ability to bid. All they have to 
believe now is that the superior firm can outbid the inferior firm. This amounts to 
believing the following:   
    (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  >      > 0.5 
Since the informed consumers can match firms with links, their prior believes does 
not matter. We will not illustrate other scenarios as that is beyond the scope of this 
research. Nevertheless, this example should be sufficient to illustrate our point. 
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Conclusion and Future Research 
In this research, we found that position paradox could not occur if the 
superior firm has an accessible organic link. Having a better ranked organic link can 
protect a firm from aggressive bidders that have superior profit margins. This applies 
to both the superior and inferior firm. Having said so, having a better ranked organic 
link can have its disadvantages too.  In general, the disadvantages can set in when 
search cost is high, both firms have superior profit margin and the firm with the better 
ranked organic link has the incentive to outbid the firm with the worse ranked organic 
link. In such cases, the firm with the worse ranked organic link could force a higher 
bid out of the firm with the better ranked organic link. The firm with the better ranked 
organic link is worse-off because the same proportion of clicks cost more now. This is 
compared to the baseline scenario where both firms do not bid for online ad space.  
From this research, marketing managers can better understand (1) the nature 
of “position paradox” and “organic advantage”; (2) the competitive advantages of 
have a better ranked organic link; (3) and the advantages of having an accessible 
organic link that is not necessarily better ranked. This better understanding can aid in 
the allocation of resources between SEO and SEM.   
Coordination of bidding strategies could be an interesting area for future 
research. Other extension could include (1) studying the effects of Google Plus on 
both organic and sponsored search results; (2) considering the additional decision of 
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Model: Demand Discounting Formulation 
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The Hamiltonian can be written as, 
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Useful Equations 
Before we evaluate the above expressions of the Hamiltonian and necessary 
optimality conditions, it will be convenient to establish some useful equations.  
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                                                  (A.7) 
 ∗( ) =   +      
∗( ) +     
∗( )                                                                      (A.8) 
Using (A.4) to (A.8) to evaluate (A.1) and (A.2), we get 
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  
 ∗( ) − 1 −   ( )   
∗( )                                             (A.9) 
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Given (A.3), we can rewrite (A.10) as 
  ( ) =  
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Given (A.3), we can rewrite (A.12) as 
  ( ) =  










       (A.18) 
Similar to (A.14), we have  
 ∗( )
 ∗( )
=      ( )                                                                                    (A.19) 
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   (A.22) 
Note that (A.17) and (A.22) suggest that the ‘shadow price’ of advertising 
expenditure and retail price are related. By equating the two equations, we can derive 
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 
−  ∗( )  ( ) ≠ 0                                  (A.28) 
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Since it can be easily shown that  
  ∗( )
  
> 0 ∀   ∈ [0,  ], the non-zero conditions in 
(A.27) and (A.28) can be easily verified by using (A17) and (A.22).  
For ease of representation, we will define 
  
∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )                                                                                                                     (A.29) 
  





∗( ) −   ( )  
∗( )]+   ( ) 
∗( )         (A.30) 
  





∗( ) −   ( )  
∗( )]+   ( )  
∗( )         (A.31) 















                                 (A.32) 
  










                              (A.33) 
  













         (A.34) 















                                             (A.35) 
  










                (A.36) 
  













   (A.37) 












       
∗( ) −   ( )  
∗( ) ≠ 0                                     (A.38) 
  








       
∗( ) −   ( ) 
∗( ) ≠ 0                                     (A.39) 




∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   < 0   ∀     ∈ [0,  ] 
  
∗( ) −   ( ) 
∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   > 0   ∀     ∈ [0,  ] 






































                    (A.41) 
 
Proof for Proposition 1.1 and 1.2 
To derive the optimal price trajectory, I will look at the scenario where optimal price 
trajectory can be characterized by an increase-decrease pattern. Using this assumption, 
I will derive the conditions where such an assumption is reasonable (or unreasonable).   
Given (A.3), (A.30) and    < 0, we know that 
  
∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   +   ( ) 
∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   < 0          (A.42) 




∗(0) =  ∗(0)ℎ∗(0)   +   (0) 
∗(0) > 0                                         ( .43) 





∗(  ) = 0 ⇒   (  ) = − ℎ







< 0                                                                                                                          ( .45) 












































































For (A.45) to be true, we must have   
   
∗(  )   −  
∗(  ) < 0 
   
∗(  )   <   +      
∗(  ) +      
∗(  ) 
−   <      
∗(  )  












,   = 1 +     +                     ( .46) 
Assume that the upper and lower bound for    are significant and remain constant 
through time. As such, we have 
  ( ) >  ,   ( ) =    ∀   ∈ [0,  ]                                                    ( .47) 
  ( ) <  ,   ( ) =    ∀   ∈ [0,  ]                                                    ( .48) 
Together, the requirement (A.46) and the assumptions (A.47) and (A.48) can be 






< 0        
∗(  ) =    −            
∗(  ) > 0          > −
1 +    
  






< 0       
∗(  ) =    −            
∗(  ) < 0          > −
1 +    
  
     ( .50) 
From equations (A.49) and (A.50), we can derive 2 set of conditions under which the 
optimal price trajectory can be characterized by a monotonically decreasing function. 
The two set of conditions are listed below. 
              1:         




              2:         




Furthermore, we can also derive 2 set of conditions under which the optimal price 
trajectory can be characterized by an increase-decrease function. The two set of 
conditions are listed below. 
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              3:         
∗(  ) > 0        > −
1 +    
  
              4:       




From these 4 set of conditions we can easily derive proposition 1.1 and 1.2. The proof 
for proposition 1.3 requires further derivation.   
Using equation (A.32) we can easily show that 
  










> 0 ⇒   
∗(  ) > 0     ( .51) 
  










< 0 ⇒   
∗(  ) < 0     ( .52) 


























∗(  ) < 0    ( .54) 
Note that in general, (A.53) and (A.54) produces 3 different optimal trajectories for 
advertising expenditure.  
   
∗(  ) > 0                
∗( ) > 0 ∀   ∈ [0,  ] 
   
∗(  ) > 0             ∃       ℎ  ℎ     
∗( ) < 0 ∀   ∈ [0,   ]  ℎ    0 <     <    
   
∗(  ) < 0  ⇒ ∃       ℎ  ℎ     
∗( ) < 0 ∀   ∈ [0,   ]  ℎ    0 <     <    
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In the next section, I will explore the conditions required for each of the three 
scenarios. 
Proof for Proposition 1.3 and 1.4 
To understand the optimal advertising trajectory, I will look at the scenario where 
optimal advertising trajectory can be characterized by a decrease-increase pattern. 
Using this assumption, I will derive the conditions where such an assumption is 
reasonable (or unreasonable).   
Given (A.3), (A.31) and    > 0, we know that 
  
∗( ) =  ∗( )ℎ∗( )   =  
∗( )ℎ∗( )   > 0                                     ( .55) 
Note that   (0) < 0. Let   (0) be large enough such that equation (A.31) is 
  
∗(0) =  ∗(0)ℎ∗(0)   +   (0) 
∗(0) < 0                                              ( .56) 




∗(  )   +   (  )  











> 0                                                                                                                            ( .58) 






































































∗(  ) > 0                                       ( .59) 











                                      ( .60) 
Assume that the upper and lower bound for     are significant and remain constant 
through time. As such, we have 
  ( ) >  ,   ( ) =    ∀   ∈ [0,  ]                                            ( .61) 
  ( ) <  ,   ( ) =    ∀   ∈ [0,  ]                                            ( .62) 
Together, the requirement (A.60) and the assumptions (A.61) and (A.62) can be 






> 0        
∗(  ) =    −            










> 0        
∗(  ) =    −            




+   ( .64) 
From equations (A.63) and (A.64), we can derive 2 set of conditions under which the 
optimal advertising trajectory can be characterized by a monotonically increasing 
function. The two set of conditions are listed below. 
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              5:         





              6:         






Furthermore, we can also derive 2 set of conditions under which the optimal 
advertising trajectory can be characterized by an decrease-increase function. The two 
set of conditions are listed below. 
              7:        





              8:        

















> 0 ⇒   











< 0 ⇒   
∗(  ) < 0       ( .66) 


























∗(  ) < 0                        ( .68) 
Note that in general, (A.67) and (A.68) produces 3 different optimal trajectories for 
price.  
   
∗(  ) > 0 ⇒  ∃       ℎ  ℎ     




∗(  ) < 0                
∗( ) < 0 ∀   ∈ [0,  ] 
   
∗(  ) < 0             ∃       ℎ  ℎ     
∗( ) > 0 ∀   ∈ [0,   ]  ℎ    0 <     <    
Using condition sets 1 to 4, equations (A.49), (A.50), (A.53), (A.54), (A.67) and 
(A.68), we can easily arrive at proposition 1.3.  
Using condition sets 5 to 8, equations (A.53), (A.54), (A.63), (A.64), (A.67) and 















Case 1 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 1.1.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 1.1.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0  (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 1 −   (1 −  )    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 1.1.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 1.1.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.1.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0  (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
Table 1.1.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0   (1 −  )    (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     
 (1 −  )(1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     
  
∗ = 0 
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
(1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
∗ 
  
∗ = 0 
 Outcome: 
o As the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above are invalid. 
 
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 1.1.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 1.1.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.1.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
 
Table 1.1.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0   (1 −  )    (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )     
 (1 −  )(1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  
  
∗ =
[(1 −  )  + (1 −  ) (1 −  )]
(1 −  )
  = (1 −   +   )  
1 −   +    < 1 ⇒   
∗ <   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 





[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
  <   
(1 −  )
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
< 1 ⇒   
∗ <   
 Outcome: 
o As the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above are invalid. 
o By process of elimination, the only outcome possible is the one in the benchmark case. 







Case 2 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 1.2.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 1.2.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 1.2.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 1.2.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.2.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 1.2.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     
  
∗ = 0 
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >   
 Outcome: 
o The optimal bid for the superior firm is invalid because the outcome contradicts the scenario conditions. 
o The optimal bid for the inferior firm is still valid (expected profit in benchmark case is the same). 
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 1.2.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 1.2.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.2.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 1.2.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  )
 (1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  
  
∗ =




∗ = (1 −   +   )  
1 −   +    < 1 ⇒   
∗ <   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff  (1 −  )    >    
 Outcome:  
o The optimal bid for the superior firm is invalid because the outcome contradicts the scenario conditions. 
o The optimal bid for the inferior firm is still valid. 
o If (1 −  )    >    and by equating the total expected profit of the inferior from table 1.2.A and 1.2.C we arrive at the 
following outcome. 
  Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm (1 −  )    (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )   
 
o If (1 −  )    <    the outcome is as detailed in the base case. 






Case 3 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 1.3.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 1.3.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0  (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 1.3.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 1.3.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.3.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0  (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
Table 1.3.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0   (1 −  )    (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     
 (1 −  )(1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
  
∗ = (1 −  )     
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 





[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
  
∗ >     iff   
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>    
 Outcome: 
o If      
(   )    
[      (   )(   )]
, (1 −  )      <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the 




, (1 −  )      >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal 
bids derived above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 






 Table 1.3.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 1.3.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.3.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
 
Table 1.3.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 
1 
Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )     
−  ) 
 (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0   (1
−  )    
(1 −  ) (1 −  )(   
−   ) 




 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(   
−   ) 
(1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )    
−  ) 
Total Expected Profit 
Superior 
   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
Total Expected Profit 
Inferior 





 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ = (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >   − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 




(1 −  )     + (1 −  ) 
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
  
∗ >     iff   
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>   −
(1 −  ) 
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )     >  
 2         > (1 −  )     >   − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )] 
        (1 −  )     <   − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )] 
  










⎧  1       
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>  
 2         >
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>   −
(1 −  ) 
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
        
(1 −  )    
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<   −
(1 −  ) 
[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
  
o For both firms, not bidding is better than bidding and getting second. 
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 2 possible stable outcomes. 
 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =  1,    =  2      
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm Yes 1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
 
Outcome 2 Conditions:    =       2  
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. (1 −  ) 
 






Case 4 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 1.4.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 1.4.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 1.4.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 1.4.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.4.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 1.4.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
  
∗ = (1 −  )     
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >    
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome: 
o If    (   , (1 −  ) 
   ) <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If min(   , (1 −  ) 
   ) >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 1.4.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 1.4.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.4.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 1.4.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  )
 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ = (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >   − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )     >  
 2         > (1 −  )     >   − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )] 
        (1 −  )     <   − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )] 
  
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   
            <  
  
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 









 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =  ,  
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 






Case 5 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 1.5.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 1.5.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 1.5.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 1.5.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.5.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 1.5.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  +  (1 −  )]    







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ = [  +  (1 −  )]    
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff  (1 −  )    >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff      >   
 Outcome: 
o If    (   , (1 −  )   ) <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If min(   , (1 −  )   ) >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 1.5.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 1.5.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 1.5.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 1.5.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  +  (1 −  )]    − (1 −  )   







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ = [  +  (1 −  )]    − (1 −  )   
  
∗ = (1 −  )    +    
  
∗ >     iff      >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff      >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )    >  
 2          > (1 −  )    > (1 −  ) 
        (1 −  )    <  
  
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   
            <  
  
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 










 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   +  (1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 







Case 6 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 2.1.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 2.1.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit  0      0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit   (1 −  )    0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1      
Inferior Firm 0  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) (1 −  )    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 2.1.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 2.1.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.1.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit   (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     
 (1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
Table 2.1.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0      0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )  
∗ =     
  
∗ = 0 
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
(1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −   )  
∗ 
  
∗ = 0 
 Outcome: 
o As the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above are invalid. 
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 2.1.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 2.1.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.1.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit    (1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     
 (1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )](1 −  )(1 −  )  
 
Table 2.1.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0       0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )  









1 +   −   
  <   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 




[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )](1 −  )
(1 −   )
  <   
 Outcome: 
o As the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above are invalid. 
o By process of elimination, the only outcome possible is the one in the benchmark case. 







Case 7 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 2.2.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 2.2.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit  0      0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )(1 −  )    
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1      
Inferior Firm 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 2.2.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 2.2.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.2.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )(1 −  )    
 
Table 2.2.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0      0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )  
∗ =     
  
∗ = 0 
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 




(1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )
(1 −  )(1 −  )
    = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >    
 Outcome: 
o The optimal bid for the superior firm is invalid because the outcome contradicts the scenario conditions. 
o The optimal bid for the inferior firm is still valid (use benchmark case). 
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 2.2.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 2.2.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.2.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )(1 −  )    
 
Table 2.2.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0      0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )(1 +   −   )  









1 +   −   
  <   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 




(1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )
(1 −  )(1 −  )
    = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >      
 Outcome:  
o The dominant strategy of both firms is to not participate in sponsored advertising. 
o Refer to the base case for information. 







Case 8 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 2.3.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 2.3.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit  0      0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit   (1 −  )    0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    
Total Expected Profit Inferior [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )]    
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    
Inferior Firm 0  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )]    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 2.3.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 2.3.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.3.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit   (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     
 (1 −  )(1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   )]    
 
Table 2.3.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0      0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    






 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  




[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     > (1 −   )  
 Outcome: 






  <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids 







  >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids 
derived above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 2.3.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 2.3.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.3.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (   
−   ) 
0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit    (1
−  )    
0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )    
−  ) 
 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1
−  )    
  (1 −  )(1
−  )     
 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(   
−   ) 
(1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )    
−  ) 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   )]    − (1 −  )(1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 
Table 2.3.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0       0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  






 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
∗ = [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ =
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    
> [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     > (1 −   )  − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
 2       [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  > (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
        (1 −  )     < [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
  
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )     > (1 −   ) 
 2       (1 −   )  > (1 −  )     > (1 −   )  − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 






o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 2 possible outcomes. 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   ) 
 
Outcome 2 Conditions:     =  2      
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) 
 
o Note that if: 
(1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
(1 −  )     > (1 −   )  
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<
(1 −  )     + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
(1 −   )
 
then we will not have a “staple equilibrium”. The first two conditions say that both firms are able to bid above minimum bid. 
The third condition says that the inferior firm can outbid the superior firm. If we start with the situation where both firms do 
not bid, then the superior firm will have an incentive to bid above minimum bid. As a consequence, the inferior firm will have 
an incentive to outbid the superior firm. If that happens, the superior firm and inferior firm will consecutively choose not to bid. 
 Suggested Action:  





Case 9 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 2.4.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 2.4.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit  0      0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    
Inferior Firm 0 1 −   (1 −  )    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 2.4.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 2.4.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.4.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 2.4.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0      0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  




[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
 Outcome: 
o If         ,
(   )    
[   (   )(   )]
  <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 




  >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 2.4.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 2.4.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.4.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0  
 (1 −  )(1 −  )     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 2.4.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0       0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − (1 −  )[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
∗ = [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ =
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
 2       [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  > (1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
        (1 −  )     < [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
  
 
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1           >  






o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm Yes 2  (1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =  2      
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 1 −   
 
o Note that if: 
(1 −  )     > [1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
    >   
(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[1 +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<     
 
then we will not have a “staple equilibrium”. The first two conditions say that both firms are able to bid above minimum bid. 





not bid, then the superior firm will have an incentive to bid above minimum bid. As a consequence, the inferior firm will have 
an incentive to outbid the superior firm. If that happens, the superior firm and inferior firm will consecutively choose not to bid. 







Case 10 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 2.5.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 2.5.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0      0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior      
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0        
Inferior Firm 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )    
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 2.5.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 2.5.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.5.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 2.5.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0   0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0      0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior      







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )  
∗ =      
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome: 
o If    (   , (1 −  )   ) <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If min(   , (1 −  )   ) >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 2.5.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 2.5.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 2.5.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0       (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 2.5.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0    0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0       0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior      − (1 −  )   







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − (1 −  )  
∗ =      − (1 −  )   
  
∗ = (1 −  )    +    
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1       (1 −  )    >  
 2         > (1 −  )    > (1 −  ) 
        (1 −  )    < (1 −  ) 
  
 
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1           >  






o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm Yes 2  (1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =  2      
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   
Inferior Firm No N.A. 1 −   
 
o Note that if  
(1 −  )    >   
    >   
(1 −  )    +    <     
 
then we will not have a “staple equilibrium”. The first two conditions say that both firms are able to bid above minimum bid. 
The third condition says that the inferior firm can outbid the superior firm. If we start with the situation where both firms do 
not bid, then the superior firm will have an incentive to bid above minimum bid. As a consequence, the inferior firm will have 












Case 11 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 3.1.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 3.1.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 3.1.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 3.1.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.1.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.1.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     
  
∗ = 0 
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 





 (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )
 
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    > [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]   
 Outcome: 
o As the outcome of the optimal bid for the superior firm contradicts the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above are 
invalid. 
o If   
∗ <  , the outcome of the optimal bids for the inferior firm contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 3.1.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 3.1.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.1.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0  (1 −  )     −    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    − (1 −  )  
 
Table 3.1.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0  (1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )
 (1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  
  
∗ =




∗ = (1 −   +   )  <   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 





 (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )
  
(1 −  )
 (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )
< 1 ⇒   
∗ <   
 Outcome:  
o The superior firm’s dominant strategy is not to advertise. 
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
        (1 −  )    > [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
        (1 −  )    < [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )] 
  
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 2 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 






Outcome 2 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 







Case 12 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 3.2.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 3.2.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 3.2.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 3.2.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.2.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.2.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     
  
∗ = 0 
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >   
 Outcome: 
o As the outcome of the optimal bid for the superior firm contradicts the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above are 
invalid. 
o If   
∗ <  , the outcome of the optimal bids for the inferior firm contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 3.2.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 3.2.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.2.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.2.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  )
 (1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =     − [(1 −  )  + (1 −  )
 (1 −  )]  
  
∗ =




∗ = (1 −   +   )  <   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
 Outcome:  
o The superior firm’s dominant strategy is not to advertise. 
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
        (1 −  )    >  .
        (1 −  )    <  .
  
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 2 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 







Outcome 2 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 







Case 13 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 3.3.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 3.3.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 3.3.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 3.3.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.3.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.3.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
  
∗ = (1 −  )     
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >    
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome: 
o If     (1 −  )    ,      <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If     (1 −  )    ,      >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 3.3.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 3.3.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.3.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0  (1 −  )     −    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    − (1 −  )  
 
Table 3.3.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0  (1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )
 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ = (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
(1 −  )    − (1 −  )  = [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
∗ 
  
∗ =  1 −
1 −  
 (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )
      +
1 −  
 (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )
  
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1        (1 −  )     >   
 2          > (1 −  )     >    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 1        (1 −  )     <    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )] 
  
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   







o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 
Inferior Firm Yes 2 (1 −  ) 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm Yes 1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 







Case 14 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 3.4.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 3.4.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 3.4.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 3.4.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.4.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.4.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
  
∗ = (1 −  )     
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >     
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome: 
o If     (1 −  )    ,      <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If     (1 −  )    ,      >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 3.4.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 3.4.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.4.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.4.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  )
 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ = (1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >    
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1        (1 −  )     >   
 2          > (1 −  )     >    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 1        (1 −  )     <    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )] 
  
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   







o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 
Inferior Firm Yes 2 0 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 







Case 15 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 3.5.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 3.5.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 1     
Inferior Firm 0 0 0 
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 3.5.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 3.5.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.5.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.5.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  +  (1 −  )]    







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ = [  +  (1 −  )]    
  
∗ = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome: 
o If     (1 −  )   ,      <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If     (1 −  )   ,      >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 3.5.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 3.5.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 3.5.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit Inferior 0 
 
Table 3.5.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and     ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 0 (1 −  )   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 0 (1 −  )      −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  +  (1 −  )]    − (1 −  )   







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ = [  +  (1 −  )]    − (1 −  )   
  
∗ = (1 −  )    +    
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
0 = (1 −  )(1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
 1        (1 −  )    >    
 2          > (1 −  )    >  (1 −  )  
 1            <  
  
o Let the inferior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   







o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 
Inferior Firm Yes 2 0 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A.   +  (1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 1 
 Inferior Firm No N.A. 0 
 








Case 16 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 4.1.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 4.1.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 
Total Expected Profit Inferior     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 0 0 
Inferior Firm 0 1     
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 4.1.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 4.1.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.1.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit   (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     −    
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )     
 
Table 4.1.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    −   
∗ = 0 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >               >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >                > (1 −  )  
 Outcome: 
o If         ,
    
(   )
  <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above 
are invalid.  
o If         ,
    
(   )
  >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived above 
are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 4.1.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 4.1.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.1.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  ) (1 −  )
 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit    (1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(    −   ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     −    
Total Expected Profit Inferior (1 −  )    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )](1 −  )(1 −  )  
 
Table 4.1.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0 0    (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 0 0 0 (1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0 0 0       −     (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     −   







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    −   
∗ =     −   
  
∗ =   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 




[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )](1 −  )
(1 −   )
  <   
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   
            <  
  
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 2 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =    
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 
Inferior Firm No N.A. (1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 2 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 0 






 Suggested Action: 





Case 17 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 4.2.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 4.2.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 
Total Expected Profit Inferior     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 0 0 
Inferior Firm 0 1     
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 4.2.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 4.2.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.2.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     −    
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )(1 −  )    
 
Table 4.2.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click         −    0 (1 −  )      −    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    −   
∗ = 0 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >           
[1 −  (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
(1 −  )
>    
 Outcome: 
o If         ,
[   (   )(   )]   
(   )
  <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids 
derived above are invalid.  
o If         ,
[   (   )(   )]   
(   )
  >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids 
derived above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 4.2.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 4.2.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.2.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior     −    
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )(1 −  )    
 
Table 4.2.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0 0    (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0 0 0       −     (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )    −     0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior     −   







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
    −   
∗ =     −   
  
∗ =   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 




(1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )
(1 −  )(1 −  )
    = (1 −  )    
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )    >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   
            <  
  
   =  
        (1 −  )    >   
        (1 −  )    <  
  
 
o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =   and   
∗ >   
∗  
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1 1 










 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 2 1 
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  ) 
  Note: Position Paradox for   ∈ (0,  1] 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 1 
 
 Suggested Action: 





Case 18 Working:    ,   =   .   
 Table 4.3.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 4.3.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 
Total Expected Profit Inferior     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 0 0 
Inferior Firm 0 1     
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 4.3.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 4.3.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.3.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit   (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   )]    
 
Table 4.3.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
∗ = 0 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >               >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >           




o If         ,
[  (   ) ]    
(   )
  <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If         ,
[  (   ) ]    
(   )
  >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 4.3.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 4.3.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.3.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) (1 −  )
 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit    (1 −  )    0 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     −     (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) (1 −  ) (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior [ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   )]    − (1 −  )(1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
 
Table 4.3.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0 0    (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability   (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0 0 0       −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click   (1 −  )    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )(    −   ) 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
∗ = [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ =
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
 
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >     iff   




 By equating the profit of the inferior firm in table Table 4.3.E to the profit of the inferior firm in Table 4.3.B: 
[ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )]    − (1 −  )(1 −   )  











 Outcome:  






            >   
















o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 3 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =   and   
∗ >   
∗  
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   +   ) 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 2 [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm Yes 1  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) 
  Note: Position Paradox if    ∈ (0.5,  1] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]>  (1 −  ) + (1 −  ) 
  > (1 −  ) 
Outcome 3 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 0 






 Suggested Action: 





Case 19 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 4.4.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 4.4.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 
Total Expected Profit Inferior     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 0 0 
Inferior Firm 0 1     
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 4.4.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 4.4.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.4.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 4.4.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click         −    0 (1 −  )      −    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
∗ = 0 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 








∗ >     iff   
1 −  (1 −  )
(1 −  )
    >   
 Outcome: 
o If         ,
   (   )
(   )
     <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If         ,
   (   )
(   )
     >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 4.4.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 4.4.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.4.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0  (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 4.4.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0 0    (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0 0 0       −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     −    
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]  
∗ = [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
  
∗ =
(1 −  )(1 −  )     + [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −   )]
 
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   
            <  
  
   =  
            >   









o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 4 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =  ,    =    
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 2 Conditions:     =  ,    =   and   
∗ >   
∗  
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −   ) 
Inferior Firm Yes 2  (1 −  ) 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 2 [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )] 
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  ) 
Note: Position Paradox if    ∈ (0.5,  1] 




Outcome 4 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 1 
 










Case 20 Working:    ,   =   ,   
 Table 4.5.A refers to condition where both bid below minimum bid price.  
 This table details the breakdown of the expected payoff for both firms when they do not participate in sponsored advertising. 
 
Table 4.5.A: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 (1 −  )    0 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 
Total Expected Profit Inferior     
 
 In this benchmark case, when both firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm 0 0 0 
Inferior Firm 0 1     
 
 Suggested Action: 







 Table 4.5.B refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table 4.5.C refers to scenario where the inferior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.5.B: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 4.5.C: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click         −    0 (1 −  )      −    0  (1 −  )(1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior 0 







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.   
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
∗ = 0 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    =     − (1 −  )   
  
∗ =




∗ >     iff   
1 −  (1 −  )
(1 −  )
    >   
 Outcome: 
o If         ,
   (   )
(   )
     <  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
o If         ,
   (   )
(   )
     >  , the outcome of the optimal bids contradict the scenario conditions, the optimal bids derived 
above are invalid.  
 Suggested Action: 








 Table 4.5.D refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the superior firm wins the bid. 
 Table 4.5.E refers to scenario where both bid above minimum and the inferior firm wins the bid. 
 Note that the cost-per-clicks listed in these tables refer to the amount the firms actually pay. The optimal bids will be derived 
subsequently. 
 
Table 4.5.D: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =     
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0   0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0 0  (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
Total Expected Profit Inferior  (1 −  )    
 
Table 4.5.E: Components of Expected Profit when    ,   =   ,  and    ,  =  ,   ,  =      
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability 0 0 0    (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click  0 0 0       −     (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Expected Profit Superior      −    







 The optimal bid for both firms can be derived by equating their total expected profit from the 2 tables above.  
 Derivations of optimal bid for superior firm: 
[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]    − [  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]  
∗ =      −    
  
∗ =
(1 −  )(1 −  )    +   
  + (1 −  )(1 −  )
 
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Derivations of optimal bid for inferior firm: 
 (1 −  )    = (1 −  )    − (1 −  )(1 −  )  
∗ 
  
∗ =     
  
∗ >     iff       >   
 Outcome:  
o Let the superior firm’s profit margin type be denoted as   . 
   =  
            >   
            <  
  
   =  
            >   









o Based on the above typing for the firms’ profit margin, there are a total of 4 possible outcomes. 
Outcome 1 Conditions:    =  ,    =    
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm No N.A.  (1 −  ) 
 
Outcome 2 Conditions:    =  ,    =   and   
∗ >   
∗  
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 1   + (1 −  )(1 −  ) 
Inferior Firm Yes 2  (1 −  ) 
 




 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm Yes 2   
Inferior Firm Yes 1 (1 −  ) 
Note: Position Paradox if    > 0.5 
Outcome 4 Conditions:    =   
 Bids >   Rank Prop. of Clicks 
Superior Firm No N.A. 0 
Inferior Firm No N.A. 1 
 







Model Extension: 3 firms 
In this model, there are 3 firms. These firms are denoted by  ,     and   . The superior firm (denoted by S) offers a product that is of higher 
quality than the inferior firms (denoted by    and   ). The profit margin and net utility of consuming the superior and inferior firms’ product 
are as follows: 
Firm Net Utility Profit Margin 
    +      
     +         
          
 
The following remains the same as the 2 firm model: 
 Informed and uninformed consumers are denoted by   and 1 −   respectively. 
 On average, the probability of choosing an organic link and sponsored link are   and 1 −   respectively. 
 The match of the product is denoted by  .  
 Organic links can either be accessible or inaccessible.  
 All accessible links have a search cost of 0 if it is visited on the first click and a search cost of    if it is visited on the second click. We 
assume that the consumer will not make a third evaluation. This assumption is robust with respect to empirical findings. 
 All inaccessible links have a search cost of     which is high enough to not warrant a visit.  





To show that our results are robust with respect to number of firms, we will solve the optimal bids under the following search cost and 
accessibility scenario. 
    ( ,  ) <    ≤     ( ,  ) <       ,   >   





In the above scenario, firm   ′  organic link is inaccessible. This scenario is most similar to   ,  (Case 3). The chosen search cost is medium 
(scenario 3 of table 3). We will not illustrate other scenarios as that is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, this example should 






Table B.1:  
 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0 (1 −  ) 0 0 0 
2nd Click Probability 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit       0 0 0 (1 −  )     0 0 0 
Expected Profit  0  (1 −  )     0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      0 0 
Total Expected Profit of firm       
Total Expected Profit of firm    (1 −  )     
Total Expected Profit of firm    0 
 
In this benchmark case, when all firms do not participate in sponsored advertising, we have 
 Bids Proportion of Clicks Expected Profit 
Superior Firm   0 1     
Inferior Firm    0 (1 −  ) (1 −  )     
Inferior Firm    0 0 0 
 
We will now derive the optimal bids when only 1 firm bids above minimum bid.  
 Table B.2 refers to scenario where the superior firm is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table B.3 refers to scenario where the inferior firm    is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 
 Table B.4 refers to scenario where the inferior firm    is the only firm that bid above the minimum bid. 







 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability    0 (1 −  )  0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0  (1 −  ) 0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 0 
Expected Profit        0 (1 −  ) (    −   ) 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(    −   ) 0 
Expected Profit  0  (1 −  )    0 0 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )     0 0 
Total Expected Profit of firm       − (1 −  )   
Total Expected Profit of firm    (1 −  )    








 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )   (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )    0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      −      0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0   (1
−  )     
(1 −  ) (1 −  )     
−   ) 




 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     
−    ) 
0 
Total Expected Profit of 
firm   
   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
Total Expected Profit of 
firm    
[ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   )]     − (1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]    










 Segment Size 
 Informed ( ) Uninformed(  −  ) 
 Organic(  ) Sponsored (  −  )   Organic  (  −  )  Sponsored (  −  )(  −  )  
 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 Link 1 Link2 
1st Click Probability   0 0 0  (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
2nd Click Probability 0   (1 −  ) (1 −  ) (1 −  ) 0 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )   (1 −  )(1 −  )  (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  ) 0 
Expected Profit 1st Click       0 0 0  (1 −  )     0 (1 −  )(1 −  )      −      0 
Expected Profit 2nd Click 0   (1
−  )     
(1 −  ) (1 −  )     
−    ) 




 (1 −  )(1 −  )(1 −  )     
−    ) 
0 
Total Expected Profit of 
firm   
   + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
Total Expected Profit of 
firm    
[  (1 −  ) +   ](1 −  )     
Total Expected Profit of 
firm    
(1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]    
 
Derivation of firm S’s optimal bid: 
    − (1 −  )  
∗ =    + (1 −  )[  + (1 −  )(1 −  )]     
  
∗ = (1 −  )     
  
∗ >     iff   (1 −  )     >   





Assume (1 −  )     <   (superior firm has no incentive to bid), we can derive firm   ʹ  optimal bid by comparing his expected profit in 
table B.3 and B.4. By doing so, we can get the following: 




[ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) − [  (1 −  ) +   ](1 −  )]    
(1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
 
   
∗ >     iff   
[ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) − [  (1 −  ) +   ](1 −  )]    
(1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
>    
 
Assume    
∗ <   (Inferior firm    has no incentive to bid), we can derive firm   ʹ  optimal bid by comparing his expected profit in table B.3 
and B.4. By doing so, we can get the following: 
0 = (1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]     − (1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]   
∗  
   
∗ =      
   
∗ >     iff        >   
If the following 3 conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     <   
[ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) − [  (1 −  ) +   ](1 −  )]    
(1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<   
     >   





To adapt the above conditions to n firms, let us first define the following:   
 
Firm Net Utility Profit Margin 
    +      
   to        +          
          
  
where    ∈ (0,1) for   = 1,2,3, … ,   − 1. Assume that firms   and    have accessible organic links and the rest do not. If the following   + 1 
conditions are satisfied, 
(1 −  )     <   
[ (1 −  ) + (1 −  )(1 −   ) − [  (1 −  ) +   ](1 −  )]    
(1 −  )[1 −    +  (1 −  )(1 −  )]
<   
     ≥   , ℎ      ∈ {2,3, … ,   − 1} 
     <     ∀  ℎ, ℎ    ℎ ∈ {2,3, … ,   − 1}− { } 
the optimal strategy for firm    is to bid and win the top spot. The other firms has either no incentive or no ability to outbid firm   .  
 
 
